

NAHDLATUL ULAMA IN FACING THE GUIDED DEMOCRACY 1959-1965: AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS

**Asep Achmad Hidayat*¹, Andri Nurjaman²,
Jafar Ahmad³, Doli Witro⁴, and Raid Alghani⁵**

^{1,2,4}*State Islamic University of Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia*

³*State Islamic Institute of Kerinci, Jambi, Indonesia*

⁵*Al Azhar University, Egypt*

*Corresponding e-mail: asepachmadhidayat724@gmail.com

DOI: 10.31291/jlka.v20.i2.1069

Accepted: October 02, 2022; Revised: December, 16 2022;

Published: December, 27 2022

ABSTRACT

Nahdlatul Ulama is one of the Islamic political parties that took part in the national political arena during President Soekarno's time from parliamentary democracy to the transition period from parliamentary democracy to guided democracy. NU's progress was closely related to its social and political factors which required NU to accept and integrate into President Soekarno's new government system. This paper aims to reveal the social and political factors that enabled NU to face and then accept guided democracy. This article employed a qualitative approach, particularly the historical study method. In tracing the socio-religious history in this study, the stages of heuristics, criticism, interpretation and historiography were taken. The results showed that NU's social factors in dealing with guided democracy were due to the presence of the PKI which was so strong in national politics and so close to President Soekarno. To deal with the PKI, like it or not, NU had to enter the government in order to resist the PKI and divert President Soekarno's inclination towards NU. Meanwhile, the political factor was to maintain NU's position in government, where had always received a share. NU efforts were done solely to protect Muslims, especially *ahlussunnah waljamaah an-nahdliyah*.

Keywords: Guided Democracy, Nahdlatul Ulama, Socio-Political Factors.

ABSTRAK

Nahdlatul Ulama merupakan salah satu partai politik Islam yang berkiprah di kancah perpolitikan nasional masa Presiden Soekarno sejak demokrasi parlementer bahkan mampu bertahan pada masa transisi dari demokrasi parlementer ke demokrasi terpimpin. Hal ini karena ada faktor sosial dan politik yang mengharuskan NU menerima dan masuk pada sistem pemerintahan baru Presiden Soekarno. Tulisan ini bertujuan mengungkap faktor sosial dan politik yang memungkiakan NU menghadapi dan kemudian menerima demokrasi terpimpin. Artikel ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif, dengan metode studi sejarah. Dalam menelusuri sejarah sosial keagamaan dalam penelitian ini, ditempuh tahapan heuristik, kritik, interpretasi dan historiografi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa faktor sosial NU dalam menghadapi demokrasi terpimpin karena adanya eksistensi PKI yang begitu kuat dalam politik nasional dan kedekatannya dengan Presiden Soekarno. Untuk menghadapi PKI maka NU mau tidak mau harus masuk dalam pemerintahan dalam rangka membendung PKI dan mengalihkan kecenderungan Presiden Soekarno kepada NU. Sedangkan faktor politik adalah untuk mempertahankan kedudukan NU di pemerintahan yang sejak zaman demokrasi parlementer NU selalu mendapatkan jatah, hal ini dilakukan semata-mata untuk menjaga dan melindungi umat Islam khususnya ahlisunnah waljamaah an-nahdliyah.

Kata kunci: Demokrasi Terpimpin Faktor Sosial-Politik, Nahdlatul Ulama.

INTRODUCTION

Through a Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was established in 1928¹ as the Indonesia's largest Islamic organization² responded by holding a Party Council

¹ Syafiq Hasyim, "Fatwas and Democracy: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Ulema Council) and Rising Conservatism in Indonesian Islam," *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1 (2020): 21–35, <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.13>.

² Alexander Arifianto, "Nahdlatul Ulama and Its Commitment Towards Moderate Political Norms: A Comparison Between the Abdurrahman Wahid and Jokowi Era," *Journal Of Global Strategic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2021):

Session in Cipanas Bogor on 26-28 March 1958. They succeeded in formulating a proposal that supported President Soekarno's intention to return to the 1945 Constitution.³ The Nahdlatul Ulama agreement had several conditions. First, the Jakarta Charter on June 22, 1945, animated the Constitution and is a source of law. Second, Islam remained the struggle of the NU party. Third, the results of the Constituent plenary session remained valid.

One of the considerations of the Decree reads as follows:

“That we believe that the Jakarta Charter dated June 22, 1945, animates the 1945 Constitution and is an integral part of that constitution.”

The word animating by Muslim nationalists was immediately used as a point of struggle demanding the enactment of the formulation of the Jakarta Charter. In the sense that the word “animates” Muslim nationalists, it means that the formulation of the Jakarta Charter (which gives a particular position to Muslims) determined the implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.⁴ However, in the view of President Soekarno and the secular nationalists, this was a different meaning. The purpose of animating was only to show the existence of relationship between the Jakarta Charter and Pancasila. The decree, was at the same time as an inspirational word, became a kind of reliever for tensions in the Constituent Assembly due to the intense demands of Islam for a state based on Islam.

From the end of 1958 until the beginning of 1959, President Soekarno had another idea to include functional groups in

77–114, <https://doi.org/10.36859/jgss.v1i1.573>; Ishomuddin Ishomuddin, “Construction of Socio-Cultural and Political Orientation of The Followers of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in the Post Reform Era in East Java Indonesia,” *Global Journal of Politics and Law Research* 2, no. 2 (2014): 39–51, <https://www.eajournals.org/journals/global-journal-of-politics-and-law-research-gjplr/vol-2issue-2-june-2014/construction-socio-cultural-political-orientation-followers-muhammadiyah-nahdlatul-ulama-nu-post-reform-era-east-java-indonesia-2/>.

³ Einar M. Sitompul, *Nahdlatul Ulama Dan Pancasila* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1989), 140.

⁴ Sitompul, 140–41.

the DPR. The issue of this group was the main topic in the political constellation in Indonesia. The response of Nahdlatul Ulama, which at that time was a political party,⁵ was to realize that President Soekarno was the strongest person in Indonesia. Therefore, Nahdlatul Ulama accepted President Soekarno's idea regarding the inclusion of functional groups in the DPR, but with the first note, the Provisional Constitution (UUDS), second, the approval of the DPR, third, the President's authority granted by the UUDS and the fourth, healthy parties to be the first channel of a healthy democracy.⁶

This functional issue became so increasingly sharp, that NU was forced to deal directly with President Soekarno three times in Bogor. NU must formulate its opinion on January 23, 1959, in which NU approved the armed forces, while artists, journalists or scientists, and so on must go through general elections.⁷

This agreement was contained in the PBNU statement letter regarding guided democracy dated February 20, 1959, as quoted by Chairul Anam as follows:

*“(a) The entry of functional groups into the DPR through general elections; (b) Following the ideas that have been put forward by NU previously, that against ABRI, the highest commanders can be appointed to sit in their respective parliaments: 15 for the Army including OKD and OPR, 5 for the AU and 7 for the police, provided that members of the armed forces armed persons do not exercise their right to vote either actively or passively in general elections; (c) the list of candidates for the parties for the general election is arranged in such a way that functional groups are included in it.”*⁸

⁵ Hari Zamharir et al., “Elite Deliberation As Deliberative Democracy: Experience of Walisongo and Nahdlatul Ulama in Nusantara/Indonesia,” *Journal of Social Political Sciences* 1, no. 4 (2020): 285–97, <http://e-journal.unas.ac.id/index.php/jsp/article/view/31/>.

⁶ Chairul Anam, *Pertumbuhan Dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama* (Solo: Jatayu, 1985), 212.

⁷ Anam, 213.

⁸ Anam, 213.

Likewise, NU's attitude towards the guided democracy system in dealing with this democratic system was more realistic and pragmatic. In this case, KH Saifuddin Zuhri as an NU political figure, for example, brought the argument that pesantren in the context of NU joining the system created by President Soekarno: "*malayudraku kulluhu laatutraku kulluhu*" [what cannot be achieved as a whole should not be discarded wholly].

Adhering to the above principles, NU in the political elite or at PBNU decided to enter the guided democracy system. This positive attitude of NU was expressed on January 11, 1959, when President Soekarno held a meeting with parties which at that time were from NU circles attended by KH Wahab Chasbullah, KH Idham Chalid, Jamaluddin Malik, and Zainal Arifin. When asked about NU's attitude towards guided democracy, Zainal Arifin replied: "Everyone knows that NU's stance is to agree with guided democracy led by Wisdom of Wisdom, Deliberation".⁹

NU, in accepting the concept of guided democracy and President Soekarno's Nasakom concept,¹⁰ used a religious foundation, namely: "*Dar'ul mafaasid muqaddamun ala jalbil mashalih*," which means avoiding harm takes precedence over taking benefits. The condition of NU was that: becoming an opposition would danger NU as whole. To avoid this harm, NU chose to cooperate to avoid damaging the NU *jam'iyah* and *jamaah* NU.

President Soekarno's idea about the Nasakom concept was inspired by the Javanese cultural heritage, a harmonious mix of all elements into one unified system. When the Nasakom idea was born, NU experienced a dilemma which was an extraordinary challenge from President Soekarno's politics. If NU stayed

⁹ Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam Dan Politik Di Indonesia Pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965)* (Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kali Jaga, 1998), 6.

¹⁰ Andri Nurjaman et al., "Tokoh Politik Islam Era Orde Lama Indonesia: Kajian Pemikiran KH Idham Chalid Dalam Menerima Konsep Demokrasi Terpimpin Tahun 1965," *Ishlah: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin, Adab Dan Dakwah* 4, no. 1 (2022): 53–74, <https://doi.org/10.32939/ishlah.v4i1.132>.

silent, it would be the same as allowing the PKI to act more freely in this Muslim-majority country of Indonesia. If NU opposed or became opposition by rejecting Nasakom, its fate will undoubtedly be like Masyumi's. Another dilemma of joining was, whether NU had to collaborate with PKI.

During this guided democracy period, since the issuance of the Decree, all political parties especially NU had to do everything in their power to survive the various political moves of President Soekarno. In this challenging situation, NU chose to be flexible with the government to survive. Survival will give hope rather than to challenge.¹¹ The attitude of NU was adjusted since the end of 1958, where NU's principles focused on "democracy" itself and not on its leadership. Unguided democracy would lead to anarchism, and something that was guided without democracy would give birth to dictatorship. This logic was the background of NU's attitude towards democracy which was later conveyed on August 13, 1958:

*"(a) its implementation does not lead to the freezing of parliamentarism; (b) its implementation does not lead to the elimination of party waze; (c) its implementation leads to the simplification and restructuring of party waze through the party law and/or refinement of the election law; (d) its implementation remains firm in holding the basic notion of sovereignty in the hands of the people which is channelled through the parliament which should be the centre of political activity; (e) its implementation still gives sovereignty and freedom to the constituents to complete their duties."*¹²

NU was active in the politics of adjustment during the guided democracy and produced positive outcomes in fighting for the interests of Islam or in the context of *izzatul Islam wal Muslimin*. It was the pinnacle of NU's success in national politics at that time. The state of NU at that time was described by Allan A. Samson as follows:

¹¹ Sitompul, *Nahdlatul Ulama Dan Pancasila*, 142.

¹² Anam, *Pertumbuhan Dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama*, 213.

“During the period of guided democracy, Islamic political activities were controlled by the NU Party, and like other political parties, NU was forced to support President Soekarno without criticism, while hoping for Soekarno’s good intentions to protect his wishes.”¹³

NU’s support for President Soekarno’s leadership was also seen at the Alim Ulama meeting in Cipanas initiated by KH Maskur who decided to give President Soekarno the title of *Waliyul Amri Dharuri Bis Syaukah*. According to A. Yusuf Ali, *Ulil Amri* are people who carry out power or responsibility or settle affairs. Islam does not recognize a sharp distinction between sacred and secular affairs regarding the affairs of the hereafter and the world, so it was hoped that the government could do the truth, could act as a faithful priest, and must respect that power as a society that was led.¹⁴ According to Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), one of the leading figures in the development of the concept of the relationship between democracy and Islam,¹⁵ the awarding of the title was a decision based on fiqh law. NU is an Islamic community organization that adheres to the fiqh paradigm,¹⁶ According to Gus Dur, the state leadership *“was not chosen by a competent Ulama for this purpose, so it did not fully have validity in the eyes of fiqh law. But his power must remain effective because he is in full power”*.

The decision to grant the title to President Soekarno, in NU’s view, was based on theological-political aims to state that

¹³ Kang Young Soon, *Antara Tradisi Dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama* (Jakarta: UI Press, 2008), 118–19.

¹⁴ Soon, 119.

¹⁵ Abdul Ghofur, “The Implications of Democratization towards Deformalization of Islamic Law in Indonesia: Study on Abdurrahman Wahid’s Thoughts,” *International Journal of Mechanical Engineering and Technology* 8, no. 6 (2017): 70–84, <https://sdbindex.com/Documents/index/0000002/00000-47925>.

¹⁶ Saefur Rochmat, “Nahdlatul Ulama, the Fiqh Paradigm and the Republic of Indonesia,” *Tawarikh* 7, no. 1 (2015): 45–62, <https://doi.org/10.2121/tawarikh.v7i1.622>.

President Soekarno was the legitimate leader of the Indonesian nation and state and must be followed and supported.

The awarding of the title was also very important for NU because what the government was facing was an Islamic political movement that opposed the legitimately ruling government, namely DI/TII.¹⁷ By giving this title, the impact was to provide stability or certainty for NU itself to comply with the actions of the government led by President Soekarno.¹⁸ Such was the attitude of NU in facing the political constellation of Indonesia in the final decade of liberal democracy or the final period of parliamentary democracy. However, NU's trials had not ended here, and NU still struggled with many challenges from the next President Soekarno, through the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959. With the issuance of the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, the entire network of political power fell into the hands of President Soekarno as the central state power and government, in a short time, the whole governance changed to a new system and pattern.¹⁹

The National Council, which had been formed on January 11, 1957, was dissolved and replaced with the Provisional Supreme Advisory Council (DPAS). The MPR, as a result of the 1955 general election was dissolved and replaced by the MPRS, the DPR was dissolved and replaced with the DPR-GR and Manipol Usdek as guidelines for Guided Democracy. President Soekarno also wanted to unite the great power among the Nationalist, Religious and Communist groups known as Nasakom.²⁰

¹⁷ A. Zaini Bisri, "Patriotism of Ulama in the Coastal Areas of Java: Philosophy and Political Doctrines of K.H. Muchlas Tegal (1886-1964)," in *Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Social Science, Humanities, Education and Society Development, ICONS 2020, 30 November, Tegal, Indonesia* (EAI, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.30-11-2020.2303724>.

¹⁸ Soon, *Antara Tradisi Dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama*, 120.

¹⁹ Farabi Fakhri, "Economic Planning during the Guided Democracy," in *Authoritarian Modernization in Indonesia's Early Independence Period* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004437722>.

²⁰ Anam, *Pertumbuhan Dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama*, 221.

Finally, President Soekarno managed to play his cards in state politics. At the same time, other parties, including NU, sought political *ijtihad* in adjusting the attitude of guided democracy, and DPR-GR NU first experienced a dilemma between accepting or rejecting. Finally, the NU Party council held a party session which took place from 24-27 April 1960. In the session of the Party Council, KH Wahab Chasbullah as Ro'is Am NU immediately determined his position, as quoted by Syafi'i Ma'arif in Syaifuddin Zuhri's book entitled KH Wahab Chasbullah, Founding Father of NU:

*"We decide now because the time is very urgent, waiting for the continuation of the deliberation can miss the train. We decide now, we just enter the DPR-GR first, and after that, we affirm the deliberation between regions. If the inter-regional deliberation decides that we must enter, we are already inside, but if the deliberation decides to reject the DPR-GR, what is the difficulty for us to leave the DPR-GR, but if now we refuse to sit in the DPR-GR, then the regional deliberations decide us we have to enter the DPR-GR, it is too late, the entrance is closed."*²¹

KH Wahab Chasbullah was indeed critical in dealing with an urgent situation like this, and he was good at taking advantage of the psychological moment of the masses. When regional deliberations were held on whether or not NU was included in the DPR-GR, KH Wahab Chasbullah's strategy received enormous support. What KH Wahab Chasbullah said was that: it was essential for NU to enter first, matters on the results of the deliberation either to refuse the DPR-GR was another latter matter. KH Wahab Chasbullah's estimate was justified by history because in the subsequent development when NU held regional deliberations regarding whether or not NU was included in the DPR-GR the result of the deliberation was to enter.²² Thus, NU played a sufficient role in the DPR-GR and was able

²¹ Maarif, *Islam Dan Politik Di Indonesia Pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965)*, 91.

²² Maarif, 92.

to struggle with President Soekarno's political moves until the guided democracy system ended in 1965. NU's logic was to deal with the realistic and challenging political situation during the guided democracy period from 1959 to 1965. The purpose of this democratic system is to reconstruct life in politics and government based on the Constitution.²³ NU accepted the presidential decree on 5 July 1959 as the initial gate for the implementation of guided democracy in Indonesia, Chairul Anam quoted his considerations as "that we believe that the Jakarta Charter dated 22 July 1945 animated the 1945 Constitution and was a series of units with the constitution".

NU's political attitude towards guided democracy was different from Masyumi's. Masyumi who was anti-PKI rejected the concept of guided democracy and did not agree with President Soekarno to return to the 1945 Constitution. Masyumi insisted on maintaining the establishment of an Islamic state in the Constituent Assembly. In Alfian's words, Masyumi at that time was called the extreme right of Islam. Because Masyumi was not in line with President Soekarno, Masyumi had to accept the consequences, namely being disbanded by President Soekarno in 1960 when Masyumi was allied with the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party).²⁴

The other reasons for the disbandment of Masyumi were involvement of a number of Masyumi leaders in several regional uprisings such as the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, and the Masyumi's reluctance to fulfil the conditions to condemn the rebellion or fire those who were involved in several rebellions.²⁵ With the disbandment of Masyumi, NU became an Islamic party

²³ Nina Lestari, Alia Ramadhani, and Syawal Syawal, "Dynamics of Development Democracy Indonesia in the Era of Jokowi Leadership," *Jurnal Netralitas Dan Pemilu* 1, no. 1 (2022): 40–50, <https://doi.org/10.55108/JNP.v1i1.179>.

²⁴ Soon, *Antara Tradisi Dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama*, 116.

²⁵ Alfian Alfian, *Pemikiran Dan Perubahan Politik di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1990), 37–38; Syafiq Hasyim, *State and Religion: Considering Indonesian Islam as Model of Democratisation for the Muslim World* (Berlin: Liberal Institute, 2013).

with a greater chance of being involved in politics in Indonesia during the guided democracy. This was not impossible because, previously, NU won the first general election in 1955. NU politics preferred to compromise with President Soekarno by staying within President Soekarno's political environment. NU became a party supporting the government along with the PNI during the leadership of President Soekarno during the Guided Democracy.²⁶

This study describes and answers a number of problem formulations including how social factors became a reality at that time so that NU as an Islamic political party decided to accept President Soekarno's concept of guided democracy? and What are the political factors that were taken into consideration by the NU Party choosing to be accommodative towards President Soekarno's new politics?

Research on Nahdlatul Ulama in dealing with guided democracy have been much carried out. First, the article entitled *Legality of the Presidential Decree July 5, 1959, and Its Effect on the Development of Democracy in Indonesia*, written by Danang Risdiarto of the National Legal Development Agency in the Indonesian Legislation Journal Volume 15 Number 01 March 2018 edition.²⁷ This article analysed the presidential decree dated 5 July 1959, which marked the implementation of guided democracy and the dissolution of the constituent assembly and parliamentary democracy system. Some experts said that the decree was unconstitutional, and others said that the legal basis of the decree was *Staatnoodrecht* which indicated the state of emergency of a country. While this study focused on the legality aspects of the guided democracy, the present study focused on NU acceptance in this democracy.

²⁶ Soon, *Antara Tradisi Dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama*, 116; Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "The Myth of Pluralism: Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 42, no. 1 (2020): 58–84, <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs42-1c>.

²⁷ Danang Risdiarto, "Legalitas Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 Dan Pengaruhnya Bagi Perkembangan Demokrasi di Indonesia," *Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia* 15, no. 1 (2018): 59–68, <https://doi.org/10.54629/jli.v15i1.54>.

Second, an article entitled *The Dimming Role of Islamic Political Parties in Guided Democracy (Case Study of the Dissolution of Masyumi by President Soekarno)*. This article was written by Alim Bathoro and published in *Kemudi: Journal of Government Science* Volume 2 Number 02 February 2018 edition.²⁸ This article explored the history and role of Masyumi during the Soekarno presidency to the reason for Masyumi's disbandment. While this study focused on Masyumi, the present study aims to explore the NU side.

Third, an article published in *Herodotus: Journal of Social Studies Education* entitled *Nahdlatul Ulama During the Government of President Soekarno (1945-1966)* written by A. Hidayat.²⁹ This article was about President Soekarno's political policies toward the political power of Islam in Indonesia and how NU's political attitude was at the end of Soekarno's reign. This article was different from the present study, as it focused on the President Sukarno, while the present study focused on NU.

From several studies conducted by previous researchers regarding guided democracy, there was little study which focused on the Nahdlatul Ulama Party in accepting President Soekarno's concept of guided democracy through an analysis of social and political factors. Therefore, this study aims to look at the social factors at that time that motivated the NU to enter into President Soekarno's new concept of democracy, namely guided democracy. It also analyses the political factors that were taken into consideration by the NU party in accepting this guided democracy.

This study used a qualitative method with a historical approach. Tracing the history of socio-religious in this research consisted of the stages of heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and

²⁸ Alim Bathoro, "Redupnya Peran Politik Islam Di Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (Studi Kasus Pembubaran Masyumi Oleh Presiden Soekarno)," *KEMUDI: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan* 2, no. 2 (2018): 24–41, <https://ojs.umrah.ac.id/index.php/kemudi/article/view/757>.

²⁹ A Hidayat, "Nahdlatul Ulama Pada Masa Pemerintahan Presiden Soekarno (1945-1966)," *Herodotus: Jurnal Pendidikan IPS* 2, no. 3 (2019): 272–82, <https://doi.org/10.30998/herodotus.v2i3.9217>.

historiography. Historical sources in this writing process were collected based on materials relevant to the themes studied.

First, heuristics, or the process of collecting sources to be studied.³⁰ The sources for this present study were all scholarly products regarding the Nahdlatul Ulama during the guided democracy period, especially on the study of socio-political factors in dealing with guided democracy. The primary sources included the book by KH Saifuddin Zuhri entitled *Mbah Wahab Chasbullah Kiai Nationalist Founder of NU* which was published by LKiS in Yogyakarta in 2010. KH Saifuddin Zuhri was a witness to the history. During the guided democracy he served as PBNU's general secretary then became the Minister of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia. The book by KH Saifudin Zuhri was included as primary sources. Second, KH Idham Chalid's book entitled *Mendajung dalam Taufan* was also primary source because it was written by a historical witness, KH Idham Chalid who served as the general chairman of PBNU at that time and was one of NU's political figures during President Soekarno's time. The *Mendajung dalam Taufan* book was also the official stance of PBNU in dealing with the guided democracy system; Third, a general chairman report of the Nahdlatul Ulama Board at the XIIIth Muktamar in Sala on December 26, 1962; And fourth, as the secondary data was the January 31, 1966 edition of the *Duta Masyarakat* newspaper. This newspaper was affiliated with NU, and recorded activities and thoughts of NU especially during the implementation of guided democracy in Indonesia.

Second, the data obtained were criticized or analysed to obtain the validity of these sources. In this critical process, a source selection process was also carried out to determine whether or not a source was accurate in terms of its content so that the source was accountable.³¹

³⁰ Sulasman Sulasman, *Metode Penelitian Sejarah* (Bandung: Pustaka Setia, 2014), 93.

³¹ Dudung Abdurahman, *Metode Penelitian Sejarah* (Jakarta: PT Logos Wacana Ilmu, 1999), 11.

Third, the historical interpretation or analysis was conducted by combining facts and data obtained.³² To examine how Nahdlatul Ulama during the guided democracy perused the socio-political factors in dealing with guided democracy, the author uses the theory of Joel M. Charron (1979) regarding the importance of the theory of symbolic interaction. Symbols were social objects in interaction that were used as representation and communication determined by the people who used them. These people gave meaning to, created and changed objects in interactions. These social symbols could manifest in physical objects such as visible objects, words to represent physical objects such as feelings, ideas, and values, and actions taken by people to give meaning to communicating with others.

Fourth, the last stage of the historical method was historiography, which was a process of compiling historical facts from various sources that have been obtained, criticized, and interpreted by a theory, so the final presentation was in the form of historical writing.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

NU Social Factors in Facing Guided Democracy

The social condition that required NU to join Nasakom politics was to dispel any movement from the dangers of the PKI. In order to fight against the PKI, NU must involve in the Nasakom element as well as in national politics. It was called 'fighting from within'. Should NU choose to fight from the outside, NU would not be able to do something significant, and PKI would have a greater chance of realizing its political ideals, namely by communizing (making communist of) Indonesia.³³

It was known that PKI attempted to realize its goals by using various tricks in various fields. For example, at home politics, PKI tried to divide and infiltrate the forces of its political opponent, namely ABRI. In education, trying to include

³² Sulasman, *Metode Penelitian Sejarah*, 107.

³³ Mary Somers Heidhues, "The 1965-66 Elimination of Indonesian Communists: Two Recent Re-Readings," *Archipel*, no. 101 (2021): 255–58, <https://doi.org/10.4000/archipel.2460>.

the teachings of Marxism-Leninism as a compulsory subject. In the military field, PKI tried to create cells and networks within ABRI and indoctrinate the teachings of communism to officers who were successfully influenced.³⁴ In overseas affairs, PKI tried to change its free and active foreign policy to a left-leaning one, namely to a communist direction. Even on the proposal of Zho Enlain, the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, the PKI created an armed force called the fifth force.

During the era of guided democracy, socially, there was a kind of ideological struggle between communist ideology and anti-communist ideology. President Soekarno wanted to stop this with his Nasakom concept. This effort could be interpreted as a search for common ground or unity suitable for the community. President Soekarno tried to compromise and unite all the ideas that existed and grew in society into a new idea that all existing elements could accept. The idea of Nasakom unity was a form of consistency from President Soekarno's thoughts, as stated in an article in 1926 entitled Nationalism, Islamism and Marxism.³⁵

The reality of the most critical condition was the growing strength of the communists. President Soekarno stated that PKI was a force that must be considered in determining the direction of the nation's journey. Eventually, with a situation like this, NU was forced to cooperate with its ideological opponents, although it aimed to dispel the activities and political ideals of the PKI.

Besides its increasingly strong position and condition in the government, NU continued to be wary of the PKI because PKI was also a pioneer in interpreting President Soekarno's ideas. The PKI interpreted President Soekarno's ideas with Marxism and occasionally with Maoism which also reflected its ideology. In this way, PKI was able to pay the political debt to President Soekarno by protecting Soekarno and instilling its political ideology in the policies taken by the government. President Soekarno personally liked PKI because their revolutionary

³⁴ Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama*, 296.

³⁵ Ahmad Muhajir, *Idham Chalid Guru Politik Orang NU* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2007), 99–100.

ideology was in line with his political ambitions. PKI also had a neat and disciplined organization that could be used to counter-balance the military. Although the military had become President Soekarno's ally in establishing a guided democracy, Sukarno was still worried about the possibility of the military wresting political control from his hands.

From this fact, KH Idham Chalid and NU generally wanted to prove that Islam could be in line with the ideas of President Soekarno whose position was influential at that time. KH Idham Chalid wanted to make sure that the forces of Islam could support the revolution that was so strongly instigated by President Soekarno and supported by the communists and their followers. NU's goal at that time was that PKI's influence on President Soekarno could be reduced because his attention was diverted to other potential forces, namely the Muslim forces led by NU.³⁶ The NU-PKI battle was illustrated in a session of the Supreme Advisory Council, D.N. Aidit (PKI) asked a question that was considered by KH Saifuddin Zuhri (Minister of Religion from NU) as an ideological satire. D.N Aidit asked a question like this to President Sukarno:

“Chairman, please ask the Minister of Religion, who is sitting on my right, what is the law according to Islam to eat the rat meat.

Earlier, at a rally called “People's Youth (Pemuda Rakyat)” at Istora Senayan, the communists ran their demonstration of eating rat jerky. It was a symbol of movement of the “penggangan (crush)” started with crushing rats, crushing village demons, crushing city demons, and crushing PKI enemies.³⁷

Then KH Saifuddin Zuhri responded as follows:

“I felt challenged by his insults in public and in front of the President. If D.N. Aidit was sincere, we sat only 20 cm apart. Even though I am a Minister, I am still a member of the DPA (concurrently). In addition, as a group leader, of

³⁶ Muhajir, Ahmad. *Idham Chalid Guru Politik Orang NU*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2007, 103.

³⁷ Muhajir, 100–101.

course, he has studied what he asked, and he already knows how the views of Indonesian Muslims regarding the law of eating rat-meat. However, he deliberately demonstrated his antipathy towards Islam.

*Brother Chairman, please tell the person on my left that I am struggling so that the people can eat fried chicken. Therefore, do not be diverted to eat rat-meat! of course, my answer invites laughter from the members, including Bung Karno, who chaired the trial.*³⁸

NU faced PKI in an era where the influence and cells of PKI had entered and permeated the government body, both in the central and in the regions, permeating parts of the body of the armed forces, youth, students, students, artists, journalists, civil servants, workers, peasants and culturalists, and others.³⁹ If Indonesia was illustrated as a body, NU faced the reality at that time that the grip of evil cancer almost severely attacked the body. NU did not give up hope of saving the body parts that could still be saved from the clutches of cancer. This job was undoubtedly challenging and full of dangers. However, fortitude and patience were held firmly by NU with its trust in Allah Swt.

Many people from other groups at this time accused KH Wahab Chasbullah or NU of flirting PKI, especially when NU declared to join Nasakom and NU became the only religious element. In fact, in 1953, when the government wanted to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by getting their respective ambassadors in Moscow and Jakarta, NU was the only party or group that opposed the opening of representatives of the Soviet Union in Jakarta. Of course, NU's attitude was considered unreasonable regarding free-active politics. However, this attitude of NU was a symbol of warning regarding how dangerous the teachings of communism and PKI.⁴⁰

³⁸ Saifuddin Zuhri, *Berangkat Dari Pesantren* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1986), 517–18.

³⁹ Saifuddin Zuhri, *Mbah Wahab Chasbullah Kiai Nasionalis Pendiri NU* (Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2010), 83.

⁴⁰ Zuhri, 83–84.

When NU was powerless to maintain its position with the government and other groups, it still wanted to place representatives of the Soviet Union and Indonesia in Jakarta and Moscow, respectively. NU saw the realization of Indonesia's free and active politics, and it relaxed its anti-communist stance with one request to the government, that was to limit the number of diplomats from the Soviet Union in Jakarta to a maximum of six people. It could be seen that NU gave a warning and vigilance to the PKI movement at that time in Indonesia.

Only NU was against the PKI's tactics in placing the "PKI and non-party" sign on the PKI's image in the 1955 elections. By sending a delegation consisting of KH Idham Chalid and Munir Abisujak, NU protested the government against this PKI trick. In a forum between PKI figures and the government or the election committee, the NU delegations were involved in a strenuous debate about whether or not it was legal to use the title "people non-party" in the PKI's hammer and sickle logo. Finally, NU protest was justified, PKI had no right and was not allowed to put up PKI picture sign with the frill "and people do not have a party."⁴¹

In fact, at first, NU rejected the four-legged cabinet consisting of NU, Masyumi, PNI, and PKI and proposed a three-legged cabinet without PKI in 1958. NU also proposed to save Indonesia's economic conditions in addition to political conditions. This was taken by NU so that the PKI would not create chaos in the economic and political fields. One day, KH Idham Chalid was asked by the authorities:

"*Why did NU get along with the PKI?*" answered KH Idham Chalid:

*"We do not fight each other! The PKI mutilated us, then we got the PKI back! We were attacked, of course, we retaliated against them!"*⁴²

Both in the councils (DPR or DPAS) and in the community, the Ro'is Am PBNU, namely KH Wahab

⁴¹ Zuhri, Saifuddin. *Berangkat dari Pesantren*. Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1986. 84–85.

⁴² Zuhri, 85–86.

Chasbullah, actively led the resistance movement against the PKI campaigns, which was getting stronger. With systematic cooperation with ABRI, the *nahdliyin* continued to defend and fortify Pancasila from the undermining of the PKI and its supporters.

There were strategic and tactical differences between NU and Masyumi in dealing with PKI. This led to a misunderstanding between Masyumi and NU. For example, KH Wahab Chasbullah was labelled a Nasakom-ulama by the Masyumi group. NU has the same assessment of the PKI, and NU has never believed in the PKI. The PKI hated NU and ABRI. NU would never become a communist. Therefore, NU had tactics and strategies to fight against PKI. The tactics used by Masyumi could not be used by NU, which resulted in its disbandment. Nevertheless, on the other hand, NU could not use fits friendly tactics to PKI. Therefore, NU used the tactic to enter the political system in dealing with PKI.

NU's strategies and tactics subsequently collaborated with ABRI in dispelling various PKI actions, especially when the Gestapu erupted. This proved that NU provided enormous assistance to ABRI without any strings attached. The only reward for NU was because it was in line with NU goal for independence, the stability of the country, and the establishment of a just, prosperous, and devoted society to Allah Swt.⁴³

Struggling against the PKI must be pursued with fighting knowledge, considering patience, vigilance, and wisdom. There were norms of struggle in difficult times, and there were also norms of struggle "under the full moon". NU was very wary of PKI's traps that always lured NU to take extreme paths and played radicals. PKI intended that NU could be cornered and easily beaten, and in the end, it could be dissolved like Masyumi.⁴⁴

Therefore, NU remained vigilant and continued to struggle against PKI by pursuing a strategy of struggle with patience. Moreover, KH Wahab Chasbullah as Ro'is Am PBNU conti-

⁴³ Zuhri, 91–92.

⁴⁴ Zuhri, 96.

nued to ignite the fighting spirit so that NU acted as a fighting party. Hand in hand with ABRI who loved justice and independence, and was solid in protecting Indonesia from the political ideals of PKI.

That was the condition of Indonesian politics in the early days of guided democracy. President Soekarno was close to PKI, and a long time ago, NU was very worried about PKI politics. NU had no choice but to accept guided democracy, the 1945 Constitution, and Pancasila; and later be flexible towards President Soekarno. It was solely done by NU so that the focus of the President's attention was not on the PKI. NU made such efforts solely to protect Indonesia from the ravages of a disease called the teachings of communism and the PKI. Not only that, NU's political strategy that chose to accept and enter Nasakom was precisely to protect the Indonesian people, especially Muslims, from the teachings and actions or unilateral actions of PKI.

NU Political Factors in Facing Guided Democracy

Nahdlatul Ulama, chaired by KH Idham Chalid, eventually accepted that President Soekarno's concept of guided democracy could not be denied. This acceptance of NU was due to political reasons, namely maintaining NU's position amid the national politics.⁴⁵ The political elites of NU at that time thought that politics was a means to realize religious interests and to serve the people.⁴⁶

Losing its place in the national political arena would make NU unable to do anything to achieve its goals, both as a religious organization and as a political party. During the transition

⁴⁵ Rina Andriani Hidayat, "The Existence of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party in the Guided Democracy Era," *Journal of Nahdlatul Ulama Studies* 3, no. 1 (2022): 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.35672/jnus.v3i1.1-21>.

⁴⁶ Imam Muhlis, *Ijtihad Kebangsaan Soekarno Dan NU* (Kebumen: CV Tangan Emas Publisher, 2013), 203; Muhammad R. Damm, "The (Trans) Formation of Religious Capital in Indonesian Politics During New Order Era: A Case Study Of Nahdlatul Ulama," *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 8, no. 2 (2018): 144–58, <https://doi.org/10.14203/jissh.v8i2.96>.

period until the implementation of guided democracy, NU used a lot of political accommodation strategies.⁴⁷ PBNU, at that time, was convinced that opposing President Soekarno with his guided democracy was futile and very dangerous. President Soekarno and the military at that time had sufficient power and support from the public to make changes and to punish the opposition who rejected this conception.

Fighting and opposing the legal government would have a negative impact on NU's interests in the political, religious, social, and economic fields. NU saw at the time that maintaining a position in the government was necessary. Even in the last four years before the era of guided democracy, NU was very dependent on the government of President Soekarno. This is evidenced by dozens of *nahdliyin* residents working as civil servants, and funding for pesantrens and madrasas mostly came from the government.⁴⁸

Many NU entrepreneurs were closely linked to the government. NU wanted to maintain its position in the government of President Soekarno. NU was also pessimistic with the coalition cabinet in the previous system. With the above political reasons, PBNU accepted the guided democracy. Furthermore, NU tried to adapt to the new democratic system, so that the party's interests were met. PBNU said that NU's goals could be achieved only by joining in the cabinet and government. This way, NU did not abandon democratic principle, while also maintaining Islamic solidarity and opposing communism.

The stronger position of President Soekarno during the guided democracy made NU a militant supporter of Sukarno to ensure the role of NU in the government. For this reason, NU chose to use a "soepel" approach as stated in its statement as follows:

⁴⁷ Greg Fealy, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967* (Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2009), 239–55.

⁴⁸ Fealy, Greg. *Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967*. Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2009. 240.

“If we (NU) are smart in placing our ideas, then he (Soekarno) will be able to think about it (plans) together (with NU), maybe even agree to some of our ideas.”⁴⁹

By accepting this political restructuring process, NU was able to secure its position in the leadership of President Soekarno during the guided democracy. NU had representatives in all institutions, even being the only largest Islamic party in Indonesia. NU has also become the main component of religious organizations that are members of Nasakom.

NU saw the fate of Masyumi, which had been dissolved by President Soekarno, as an attitude of excessive rigidity and idealism. By choosing a position in government, NU could continue to serve and defend the interests of traditional Muslims.⁵⁰ The transition to a guided democracy system showed that from the peak of NU’s accommodative attitude, NU was proven to be willing to compromise with President Soekarno’s government in almost all fields. The only exception for NU support was when the policy was deemed a direct threat to the welfare of the party and its voters. Therefore, as long as President Soekarno still provided an opportunity for NU to take control of the Ministry of Religion and to avoid actions that interfere with the implementation of Muslim worship, NU would continue to cooperate with the government.

NU’s attitude, which tended to avoid risk, made it avoid any confrontation with President Soekarno. PBNU’s most important concern at that time was to adapt to the political emergency and not to change it.⁵¹ This can be seen in the speech of the general chairman of PBNU, KH Idham Chalid, as follows:

“At a time when the Indonesian revolution was being stirred up as much as possible in all fields, it was being stirred up and led by the great leader of the Indonesian revolution, namely Bung Karno, where all the people, like it or not, had to participate or be carried away by the revolution in all fields.

⁴⁹ Fealy, 41.

⁵⁰ Fealy, 283.

⁵¹ Fealy, 284.

The whole people had no choice but to participate in the evolution or stand on the side of the counter-revolution. In such a turbulent time, the 22nd Congress in Jakarta congratulated us on starting the period of implementing its decisions, saving the party's ark to be rowed as far and as strong as possible towards its goals. Truly "mendajung dalam taufan".

A little careless, less understanding of the direction of the wind, the slightest rudder is not adjusted to the ripples of the waves, this ship will surely sink with all its contents.

We, to face all possibilities, accommodate all situations so that when the wheels of a situation that are turning rapidly as a result of the revolution give rise to new events and developments, our party swiftly and deftly accommodates the situation and puts itself in the safest position."⁵²

The political position held by NU was also seen long before the guided democracy, namely with the appointment of KH Wahid Hasyim from NU, who served three consecutive terms. This could happen because of President Soekarno's love for NU, as he stated in a speech, "I love NU very much" the speech was delivered by President Soekarno at the closing ceremony of the Nahdlatul Ulama Congress in Solo on December 29, 1962. President Soekarno's love for *jam'iyah* Nahdlatul Ulama continued, as seen at the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of NU, President Soekarno exclaimed: "*I love NU, NU love me. I embrace NU, then NU embrace me.*"⁵³

During the reign of President Soekarno, relations with NU were increasingly and closely intertwined. President Soekarno continued to try to embrace NU so that what he planned for the Republic of Indonesia received strong support from NU. One time, there was an incident, KH Wahab Chasbullah warned President Soekarno. He said: "*Soekarno without NU would be*

⁵² Idham Chalid, *Mendajung dalam Taufan* (Jakarta: Endang-Api Islam, 1966); Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU), *Laporan Ketua Umum Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama Dalam Mukhtamar Ke XIII Di Sala* (Surakarta: 26 Desember, 1962).

⁵³ Duta Masyarakat, *Koran Duta Masyarakat* (31 Januari, 1966).

difficult to carry out his political program. Likewise, NU without Soekarno will be dismantled (uprooted).”⁵⁴

On January 3, 1946, as an appreciation and love for NU, President Soekarno gave a full mandate to take part in the government by giving the position of Minister of Religion to KH Wahid Hasyim for three consecutive times. For NU, the position of Minister of Religion was a key that made NU very profitable in the long term because it has provided a legal basis for socio-religious activities of Muslims, especially for *nahdliyin*.⁵⁵

Modernists opposed this decision. In 1952, Masyumi demanded that NU relinquished the position of Minister of Religion because it had been three times. NU refused, but in the end, the position of Minister of Religion was then held by Faqih Usman from Muhammadiyah. A year later in 1953 when NU had separated from Masyumi, NU was successful in convincing both the Minister of Religion and President Soekarno to get the position of Minister of Agriculture and even the position of Deputy Prime Minister. Thus, the position of NU was getting more robust in the government, and the role of NU in influencing and coloring the course of the government was increasingly wide open.⁵⁶

NU's flexible and accommodative political strategy led NU's best cadres to take part in the world of politics, which took place between 1950 and 1967. This was also the political or pragmatic reason for NU to enter and support the government of President Soekarno. Greg Fealy had noted that many NU cadres entered the government led by President Soekarno, from the parliamentary democracy era to the era of guided democracy, including:⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Muhlis, *Ijtihad Kebangsaan Soekarno Dan NU*, 209–10.

⁵⁵ Muhlis, 210.

⁵⁶ Muhlis, *Imam. Ijtihad Kebangsaan Soekarno dan NU*. (Kebumen: CV Tangan Emas Publisher), 2013, 212–13.

⁵⁷ Muhlis, 214–16.

1. KH A. Wahid Hasyim, as Minister of Religion in the Natsir Cabinet (1950-1951) and Sukiman Cabinet (1951-1952).
2. KH Masjkur, Minister of Religion in the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjoyo I (1955).
3. Zainal Arifin as Deputy Prime Minister in the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjoyo I (1955).
4. Mohammad Hanifah as Minister of Agrarian Affairs in the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjoyo I (1955).
5. Mr. Sunarjo as the Minister of Home Affairs in the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjoyo I (1955), in the cabinet of Burhanudin Haraphap (1956), and in the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjoyo II (1957). In the Karya cabinet (1957-1959), Mr. Sunarjo was Minister of Agrarian Affairs, later replaced by Rahmat Muljomiseno and added by KH Wahib Wahab from NU as Minister of Civil-Military Cooperation.
6. KH Mohammad Ilyas as Minister of Religion in the Burhanudin Haraphap cabinet (1956), Ali Sastroamidjoyo II cabinet (1957), and Karya cabinet (1957-1959). He also served as Minister of Ulama-Government Relations in the Dwikora Cabinet (1966).
7. KH Idham Chalid as Deputy Prime Minister II in the Ali Sastroamidjoyo II cabinet (1957), Karya cabinet (1957-1959). In the Karya cabinet (1957-1959) he served as the Second Deputy Spokesperson of the MPRS in the Work Cabinet (1954) and the Dwikora cabinet (1966).
8. Mr. Burhanuddin as the Minister of the Economy in the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjoyo II (1957).
9. KH Fatah Jasin as Minister of Social Affairs in the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjoyo II (1957). In the Working Cabinet (1954) he served as liaison Minister for Alim Ulama. He was a State Minister Assistant to the coordinating minister for Religious Affairs in the Dwikora Cabinet (1966).
10. Prof. Dr. Sunardjo as Minister of Trade in the Karya cabinet (1957-1959).

11. KH Wahib Wahab as Minister of Religion in the Working Cabinet (1954), then replaced by KH Syaifuddin Zuhri.
12. Zainul Arifin as Spokesperson for DPR-GR in the Working Cabinet (1954).
13. KH Ahmad Syaichu was the Fourth Spokesperson of the DPR-GR in the Working Cabinet (1954). As the Fourth Spokesperson of the DPR-GR in the Dwikora Cabinet (1966).
14. H. Aminudin Aziz as the Minister of State Secretary in the Dwikora cabinet (1966).
15. KH Saifuddin Zuhri as Coordinating Minister for Religious Affairs in the Dwikora Cabinet (1966).
16. H. Mohammad Hasan as Minister of Revenue, Funding and Supervision in the Dwikora Cabinet (1966).

After undergoing a cabinet reshuffle, the remaining NU ministers in the cabinet remained KH Idham Chalid as Deputy Prime Minister II, KH Saifuddin Zuhri as Minister of Religion and H. Aminudin Aziz as Minister of Village Community Development, and KH Ahmad Syaichu as Secretary of the National Front. This number shrunk to two people in the Ampera cabinet (1966-1968), namely KH Idham Chalid as the Main Minister of People's Welfare and KH Saifuddin Zuhri as Minister of Religion and then replaced by KH Mohammad Dahlan in 1967.⁵⁸

As long as NU was active in national politics in the era of President Soekarno, both during the parliamentary democracy and during the guided democracy, NU had made many achievements. Among them was the implementation of the first general election which was handed over to an election committee whose members consisted of representatives of political parties. Law No. 7 of 1953, which became the operational basis for the 1955 elections, was not implemented by the government. The election

⁵⁸ Muhlis, Imam. *Ijtihad Kebangsaan Soekarno dan NU*. (Kebumen: CV Tangan Emas Publisher), 2013, 218.

was then carried out based on the policy of the Minister of Home Affairs, namely Mr. Soenarjo from NU.

Another NU achievement during the old order was the initiative to establish the Istiqlal mosque by KH Wahid Hasyim as Minister of Religion at the time, which President Soekarno approved. The implementation was realized at the time of the Minister of Religion, KH M. Ilyas. Then by the idea of IAIN by KH Wahib Wahab, the realization of the translation of the Qur'an into Indonesian by the Minister of Religion KH Syaifuddin Zuhri. Another remarkable achievement was the Musabaqoh Tilawatil Quran who was initiated by the Minister of Religion KH M. Dahlan.

With such accomplishments, President Soekarno appreciated the role of NU. NU had become a buffer for President Soekarno's government. It was then normal when eventually several vital positions and positions were given to NU by President Soekarno. He even mentioned that political achievements inscribed by NU were brilliant at that time.⁵⁹

From these facts, it was clear that the political reason why NU accepted President Soekarno's concept of guided democracy was that to maintain and expand the political positions already occupied by NU at the beginning of President Soekarno's administration. This was not merely a pragmatic and opportunist NU, instead it was a proof is that during the time NU was active in politics under President Soekarno, it produced many achievements, all of which were beneficial for Muslims.

CONCLUSION

As the biggest Muslim organization throughout the history, NU had made strategies and efforts in surviving the changing political reigns. During the guided democracy time, NU was challenged, as to support the democracy or to fight against it. NU chose the first to accept the guided democracy, and even involved in the system. This acceptance was due to social factor and political factor.

⁵⁹ *Muhlis, Imam. Ijtihad Kebangsaan Soekarno dan NU.* (Kebumen: CV Tangan Emas Publisher), 2013, 218.

The social factor of NU in accepting guided democracy was due to the circumstances that required NU to take part in national politics to represent Muslims in the dangers of communism teaching and the political ideals of PKI in Indonesia at that time. Meanwhile, the political factor of NU was because it aimed to maintain the seat and position of NU in the government of President Soekarno, which had been allocated since the era of parliamentary democracy. Therefore, NU accepted the guided democracy to secure several strategic positions in the government of President Soekarno, and this was solely for the benefit of Muslims.

This study contributed in the literature by foregrounding NU wise and effective strategies to deal with something that were not favorable for them. They did it by still holding their principle tightly, namely to guard the needs of Indonesian Muslims. Further studies could be conducted in viewing NU survivalness in the current political situation or in different political era.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Thank you for all who have contributed to this research so that it can be completed in the form of a scholarly article. This research was not funded by any institution; all of expenses related to the research and publication of this paper were self-funded.

REFERENCES

Books

Abdurahman, Dudung. *Metode Penelitian Sejarah*. Jakarta: PT Logos Wacana Ilmu, 1999.

Alfian, Alfian. *Pemikiran dan Perubahan Politik Di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Gramedia, 1990.

Anam, Chairul. *Pertumbuhan Dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama*. Solo: Jatayu, 1985.

- Chalid, Idham. *Mendajung Dalam Taufan*. Jakarta: Endang-API Islam, 1966.
- Fakih, Farabi. "Economic Planning during the Guided Democracy." In *Authoritarian Modernization in Indonesia's Early Independence Period*. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004437722>.
- Fealy, Greg. *Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967*. Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2009.
- Hasyim, Syafiq. *State and Religion: Considering Indonesian Islam as Model of Democratisation for the Muslim World*. Berlin: Liberal Institute, 2013.
- Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. *Islam Dan Politik Di Indonesia Pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965)*. Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kali Jaga, 1998.
- Muhajir, Ahmad. *Idham Chalid Guru Politik Orang NU*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2007.
- Muhlis, Imam. *Ijtihad Kebangsaan Soekarno dan NU*. Kebumen: CV Tangan Emas Publisher, 2013.
- Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU). *Laporan Ketua Umum Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama Dalam Mukhtamar Ke XIII Di Sala*. Surakarta: 26 Desember, 1962.
- Sitompul, Einar M. *Nahdlatul Ulama Dan Pancasila*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1989.
- Soon, Kang Young. *Antara Tradisi Dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama*. Jakarta: UI Press, 2008.
- Sulasman, Sulasman. *Metode Penelitian Sejarah*. Bandung: Pustaka Setia, 2014.
- Zuhri, Saifuddin. *Berangkat Dari Pesantren*. Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1986.
- . *Mbah Wahab Chasbullah Kiai Nasionalis Pendiri NU*. Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2010.

Journal articles

- Arifianto, Alexander. "Nahdlatul Ulama and Its Commitment towards Moderate Political Norms: A Comparison between the Abdurrahman Wahid and Jokowi Era." *Journal Of Global Strategic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2021): 77–114. <https://doi.org/10.36859/jgss.v1i1.573> .
- Bathoro, Alim. "Redupnya Peran Politik Islam di Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (Studi Kasus Pembubaran Masyumi oleh Presiden Soekarno)." *KEMUDI: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan* 2, no. 2 (2018): 24–41. <https://ojs.umrah.ac.id/index.php/kemudi/article/view/757>.
- Bisri, A. Zaini. "Patriotism of Ulama in the Coastal Areas of Java: Philosophy and Political Doctrines of K.H. Muchlas Tegal (1886-1964)." In *Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Social Science, Humanities, Education and Society Development, ICONS 2020, 30 November, Tegal, Indonesia*. EAI, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.30-11-2020.2303724>.
- Damm, Muhammad R. "The (Trans)Formation of Religious Capital in Indonesian Politics During New Order Era: A Case Study Of Nahdlatul Ulama." *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 8, no. 2 (2018): 144–58. <https://doi.org/10.14203/jissh.v8i2.96>.
- Ghofur, Abdul. "The Implications of Democratization towards Deformalization of Islamic Law in Indonesia: Study on Abdurrahman Wahid's Thoughts." *International Journal of Mechanical Engineering and Technology* 8, no. 6 (2017): 70–84. <https://sdbindex.com/Documents/index/00000002/00000-47925>.
- Hasyim, Syafiq. "Fatwas and Democracy: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Ulema Council) and Rising Conservatism in Indonesian Islam." *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and-National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1 (2020): 21–35. <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.13>.

- Heidhues, Mary Somers. “The 1965-66 Elimination of Indonesian Communists: Two Recent Re-Readings.” *Archipel*, no. 101 (2021): 255–58. <https://doi.org/10.4000/archipel.2460>.
- Hidayat, A. “Nahdlatul Ulama pada Masa Pemerintahan Presiden Soekarno (1945-1966).” *Herodotus: Jurnal Pendidikan IPS* 2, no. 3 (2019): 272–82. <https://doi.org/10.30998/herodotus.v2i3.9217>.
- Hidayat, Rina Andriani. “The Existence of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party in the Guided Democracy Era.” *Journal of Nahdlatul Ulama Studies* 3, no. 1 (2022): 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.35672/jnus.v3i1.1-21>.
- Ishomuddin, Ishomuddin. “Construction of Socio-Cultural and Political Orientation of The Followers of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in the Post Reform Era in East Java Indonesia.” *Global Journal of Politics and Law Research* 2, no. 2 (2014): 39–51.
- Lestari, Nina, Alia Ramadhani, and Syawal Syawal. “Dynamics of Development Democracy Indonesia in the Era of Jokowi Leadership.” *Jurnal Netralitas Dan Pemilu* 1, no. 1 (2022): 40–50. <https://doi.org/10.55108/JNP.v1i1.179>.
- Mietzner, Marcus, and Burhanuddin Muhtadi. “The Myth of Pluralism: Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia.” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 42, no. 1 (2020): 58–84. <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs42-1c>.
- Nurjaman, Andri, Arzam Arzam, Zufriani Zufriani, and Doli Witro. “Tokoh Politik Islam Era Orde Lama Indonesia: Kajian Pemikiran KH Idham Chalid Dalam Menerima Konsep Demokrasi Terpimpin Tahun 1965.” *Ishlah: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin, Adab Dan Dakwah* 4, no. 1 (2022): 53–74. <https://doi.org/10.32939/ishlah.v4i1.132>.
- Risdiarto, Danang. “Legalitas Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 Dan Pengaruhnya Bagi Perkembangan Demokrasi di Indonesia.” *Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia* 15, no. 1 (2018): 59–68.

<https://doi.org/10.54629/jli.v15i1.54>.

Rochmat, Saefur. “Nahdlatul Ulama, the Fiqh Paradigm and the Republic of Indonesia.” *Tawarikh* 7, no. 1 (2015): 45–62. <https://doi.org/10.2121/tawarikh.v7i1.622>.

Zamharir, Hari, TB Massa Dja’far, Sahrudin Lubis, and Siti Sadiyahunnimah. “Elite Deliberation As Deliberative Democracy: Experience of Walisongo and Nahdlatul Ulama in Nusantara/Indonesia.” *Journal of Social Political Sciences* 1, no. 4 (2020): 285–97. <http://e-journal.unas.ac.id/index.php/jsps/article/view/31/>.

Newspapers

Duta Masyarakat. *Koran Duta Masyarakat*. 31 Januari, 1966.